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A well-informed ‘model of administration’ for 
agrarian states. Or: how not to fall into the trap of 
‘nostrification’ when comparing colonial West African 
States with 18th century Prussia
Hubert Treiber
In a noteworthy essay entitled “The Operation Called Vergleichen (Comparison)” Joachim Matthes has 
drawn attention to the fact that studies which claim to compare particular phenomena from one’s own cul-
ture (such as law or administration, for example) with those of an alien culture do not, strictly speaking, 
perform a real comparison.  Instead, what takes place is (in his words) a “nostrification”, that is, “an ap-
propriation of the other in one’s own terms” or conceptual assimilation.  Even the ideal-type constructions 
of Max Weber seem largely to confirm this proposition.  In principle, then, it ought to be quite hard to 
find studies which are not exposed to the charge of nostrification.  In what follows works by Gerd Spittler 
are examined in some detail from this particular perspective.  In the first instance Spittler investigated the 
specific problems encountered by the colonial administration in West African peasant states (1919-39), 
before examining if this problematic could be applied to the peasant state of Prussia in the 18th century.  
So, for example, he asked himself how a bureaucratic administration reliant on written documents resolved 
the problem of raising taxes on a body of untruly peasants who to a large extent communicated orally 
amongst themselves.  Since in both cases Spittler relates the typical structures of an agrarian society to 
typical administrative structures, he attains a level of reflection where the ‘“One” can be translated into 
the “Other” and vice versa’ (Matthes), and in this way he escapes the particular danger of nostrification.
1. Introduction
In his noteworthy essay “The Operation Called Vergleichen” Joachim Mat-
thes (1992) has suggested that as a rule the procedures aimed at comparing 
particular phenomena of one’s own culture (administration, for example) with 
those of an alien culture do not, strictly speaking, make a comparison.  In-
stead, this involves “a ‘nostrification’, an appropriation of the other in one’s 
own terms” (Matthes 1992: 84).  Elsewhere in his essay he elaborates on this:
The aporia of  such a ‘comparative’ practice consists firstly in the fact that its 
tertium is not constructed as a meta-reflection, but forms it as a cultural pro-
jection.  The other aspect of  this aporia is that a tertium gained through a cultural 
projection provides at the same time the standard for the search, for the identification of  
comparative phenomenon elsewhere. The there for the substance (Sachverhalt) of  this 
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‘comparison’ is detected with the aid of  this projected tertium using the concept 
that the here of  the content to be ‘compared’ has of  itself  – transposed into an 
abstraction unlimited with respect to time and space.  What is presented as 
‘comparison’ is performed, first, as an identification of  what is ‘like’ (or on a 
‘par’) according to its own standard, before com-parison (Ver-gleichen) as an 
explicit operation begins. (Matthes 1992: 83).
Once this illuminating observation is taken into account, we realise that 
there are very many instances of this.1  Some of Max Weber’s ideal-typical 
constructions take this form, and seem to provide confirmation for Matthes’ 
claim.  On the other hand, it appears much more difficult to show how one 
might avoid this trap of “nostrification”.  However, it seems to me that the 
studies of Gerd Spittler do offer a demonstration of this kind.
Gerd Spittler, a sociologist by training, but one whose first-rate credentials 
as an ethnologist are displayed in his field research (Spittler 1978: 140ff.), had 
a fascinating idea. Having investigated the manner in which (colonial) West 
African peasant states were administered during the period 1919-1939, he de-
vised a ‘model of administration in peasant states’ (Spittler 1976; 1978; 1981), 
applying this model to agrarian 18th century Prussia (Spittler 1980), framing 
it as an intercultural comparison in which he first examined the interaction be-
tween administration and peasant culture in Prussia.2  Spittler demonstrates 
typical patterns of domination in the agrarian Prussia of the 18th century, 
but also administrative problems of the type that regularly tend to crop up 
in the day-to-day practice of administration.  By linking the structures of 
an agrarian society (a peasant state) to typical administrative structures and 
problems (Spittler 1981: 9), he is able to construct a well-informed ‘model of 
administration’ for agrarian states, avoiding the danger of nostrification, the 
“appropriation of the other in one’s own terms” (Matthes), especially since he 
begins his intercultural comparison with the analysis of a twentieth-century 
African agrarian society, then shifting his perspective to eighteenth-century 
Prussian agrarian society, a society which we today perceive as remote.
Drawing upon Spittler’s work on colonial West Africa (1919-1939) and on 
the agrarian society of Prussia in the 18th century, the following paper sketch-
es in outline a ‘model of administration’ in peasant states. In doing so, I draw 
upon more recent studies than were available to Spittler at the time when he 
constructed and tested his model (Eifert 2003; Wagner 2005).  
1 Treiber 2012: 28f.  
2 Spittler’s “model of  interaction between agrarian peasant societies and (bureaucratic) admin-
istration” can in part be “applied to the Prussian bureaucracy as it existed from the turn of  the 
century to the 1860s” (Wagner 2005: 63).
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2. The development of a ‘model of administration’ in agrarian states 
2.1 Typical characteristics of agrarian states or peasant societies
First of all, some terms need to be explained. Spittler, drawing upon Max 
Weber, defines a ‘state’ as a ‘territorial political association with a central 
authority and bureaucracy’, which claims ‘to exert direct domination’ over its 
members (Spittler 1981: 13). A state can be described as an ‘agrarian state’ if 
farmers make up the majority of the population and if the burdens of taxation 
and other obligations fall first and foremost on them, and they can also be 
conscripted when military forces have to be raised (Spittler 1981: 13). Agrar-
ian or peasant states can also be defined in terms of the degree to which 
a monetary and market economy has developed. For the present purpose, 
the following will suffice: where there is widespread subsistence agriculture 
and self-sufficiency (i.e. a low level of market integration), the administration 
will find itself confronted with substantial problems, for example in the fields 
of information gathering and surveillance. The agrarian states investigated 
by Spittler in colonial West Africa (1919-1939) are characterized by an oral 
culture, i.e. ‘communication and intellectual abilities are predominantly gov-
erned (by the oral mode)’, though this is by no means intended to imply that 
peasant farmers lack talents or are ignorant. Where Prussia is concerned, Spitt- 
ler can draw on an outstanding authority, in the person of Christian Garve, 
to demonstrate the contrary, namely that a specific type of intelligence is to be 
found amongst the peasant population that can be ascribed to their methods 
of production and their subjection (Spittler 1981: 18f.; Garve 1796). Even if 
it is accepted that the ability both to read and to write is to be found among 
peasant farmers to a certain degree (Quéniart 1981), it may nevertheless be 
assumed that the description of rural areas in the 18th century as a ‘world 
of semi-oral culture’ is an apt one. For this characterization we are indebted 
to the highly illuminating study by Quéniart (1981: 133). Much light is also 
shed by his remarks and suggestions on the ‘delimitation of partial literacy’, 
in the course of which he states that ‘partial literacy that is limited to the abil-
ity to read does little to change the nature of a person’s cultural dependency. 
In oral culture the memory continues to be the only means of accumulating 
and transmitting knowledge: such partial literacy “does not change the indi-
vidual’s relationship to this culture, but reinforces it.” Only when the ability to 
write has been acquired may we assume that such a change occurs (...)’  (Qué-
niart 1981: 117). The picture painted by von Ungern-Sternberg (1987: 386f.) 
for some 18th century  German states either supports Quéniart’s or at the very 
least does not contradict it:
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Thus while many people who were described as illiterate could not, or could 
hardly, write, they were nevertheless, at least to a certain degree, able to read. 
(...). Around 1800, Württemberg, Saxony and the Thuringian states, above 
all Gotha, were considered to be exemplary regions, thanks above all to their 
relatively well-developed school systems, whereas the Palatinate, for example, 
was judged to be distinctly backward. (...). Even if  elementary reading abilities 
were more widespread in Germany than has been assumed up to now, for most 
peasants, as for the lower social classes and the lower middle class, reading 
was a “surplus activity”, at least to the extent that it went beyond the needs 
of  religious observance and the modest amount of  leisure time available (see 
Friederich 1987: 126ff.).
All this means that ‘information was [predominantly] not laid down in 
writing, but was stored in the memory’ (Spittler 1981: 19) and handed down 
orally. To this extent, the ‘elders’ occupy a special position as reliable sources 
of information. Thus ‘the retrieval of information (...) is much more strongly 
dependent on people than it is in a written culture which accumulates its 
knowledge in books and documents’ (Spittler 1981: 19). Wagner (2005: 106f.) 
finds a particular impressive example that may stand for many others as late 
as the year 1871 (!) in Prussia: 
When there were conflicts about the boundaries between the areas of  land 
assigned to private and to communal use, those concerned found themselves 
on shifting sands as far as the legal basis was concerned, since the stock of  in-
formation that the authorities could draw upon in order to mediate in conflicts 
was diffusely distributed in the village. Mostly it was a case of  memory versus 
memory, while the few written or cartographical documents (…) were all too 
often imprecise and susceptible to different interpretations.’ The procedure 
used to resolve such conflicts tells its own tale: the Dorfschulze, the village mayor 
or reeve, who represented ‘the very lowest level of  the state administrative ap-
paratus’ (Wagner 2005: 112), was permitted, as a person acting in an official 
capacity, to draw upon his ‘personal memory’ if  ‘there were no documents 
available and people’s recollections diverged (Wagner 2005: 107). 
However, the implications of a written culture are more far-reaching: ‘Def-
initions of terms, abstraction from concrete situations and individual cases, 
thinking in lists and tables, all these features that constitute the way a bureau-
cracy operates, cannot be dissociated from written culture’ (Spittler 1981: 19). 
This can be seen above all if, as was the case in Prussia, there are particular 
regions where particular dialects (e.g. Low German) or other languages (e.g. 
Polish) were spoken. Those who are at home in such a dialect or language, 
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those whose whole manner of speaking and thinking is shaped by it, do not (in 
the 18th century) necessarily feel the need to learn the dominant written lan-
guage which is at the same time the language of the administration. Rather, 
for groups of the population who have no need to master the written lan-
guage, bilingualism is more of a hindrance, especially to learning to write 
(Quéniart 1981: 125). Moreover, written information can easily be passed on 
orally by a small number of persons, e.g. by the village clergymen, so that it is 
not essential to be able either to read or to write (Quéniart 1981: 133).
Characteristic features of agrarian states, especially those with a low level 
of market integration, are on the one hand the high degree of inaccessibility 
of the peasants living in remote villages, scattered hamlets or isolated farms, 
and on the other hand the regional and local heterogeneity, which makes it 
extremely difficult to obtain a clear picture: ‘Where every village has its own 
customs, where there are sharp distinctions in language and dialect from re-
gion to region or even from village to village, where a word may mean differ-
ent things in different villages, and the same thing be designated by different 
words, where every little town has differing units of length, area, capacity 
and weight, but all use the same words for them’ (Spittler 1980: 578), any 
administrative apparatus will find it difficult to collect reliable information 
and evaluate it, and to enforce compliance with its general (and increasingly 
abstract) rules. The multiplicity and diversity of local and regional harvest 
customs is well documented for as late as 1865 (!) by a survey, carried out by 
Wilhelm Mannhardt, of the names given to particular harvest customs and 
their dissemination in Germany and some adjoining countries, because he 
was seeking to demonstrate – being in this respect a true disciple of Tylor’s – 
that these were ‘remnants of a Teutonic religious cult’ (Kippenberg 1997: 125; 
Mannhardt 1868; Tylor 1873). 
It is necessary to consider briefly the extent to which 18th century Prussia 
was an agrarian or peasant state. Spittler (1980: 584ff.) states that it was. In 
terms of the features set out at the beginning of this paper, Prussia was not 
only an agrarian state, but was characterized by a degree of heterogeneity 
that was inescapable to any observer and confronted the bureaucratic admin-
istration with substantial challenges: ‘Prussia was heterogeneous not only with 
regard to its weights and measures, but also in language, religion and ethnic 
composition, in manners, customs and law’ (Spittler 1980: 585). Prussia as a 
military and agrarian state was particularly dependent upon its peasants as 
recruits and as taxpayers. They were the ones that bore the burden of the Kon-
tribution (see below) that was regularly levied, and which represented a more 
important source of income for the state than the municipal excise duties; and 
in addition, the peasants made an essential contribution to the incomes of the 
landed estates (Büsch 1962: 5f., 16f., 21f.; Braun 1975). As explained above, 
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the assumption that rural areas were a ‘world of semi-oral culture’ may also 
be taken to apply to 18th century Prussia. Wagner (2005: 111) gives a vivid ex-
ample of this from as late as 1850 (!) in relation to a village in West Prussia. Of 
the 113 people who took part in a parish meeting in that year, 43 (48.6%), i.e. 
almost half, did not sign the record but placed their marks under it in the form 
of three crosses. But illiteracy is likely to have been widespread even among 
the holders of positions in the lowest ranks of the administration, the village 
reeves (Dorfschulzen) and the Kreisreiter, the officials who toured the district on 
behalf of the Landrat (Wagner (2005: 122f.).
2.2 Three types of administration in agrarian societies: bureaucratic, intermediary 
and arbitrary administration
In considering the workings of the administration in colonially governed 
agrarian societies with a view to gaining insights that are susceptible to com-
parison with agrarian Prussia, Spittler constructs three ideal-types of admin-
istration (Spittler 1981: 21ff.): bureaucratic, intermediary and arbitrary (ex-
tending as far as despotic), each of which is distinguished by quite definite 
advantages and disadvantages. Bureaucratic administration rests, according to 
Max Weber’s ideal type (Treiber 2007), on abstract, universally applicable 
rules or on abstract knowledge that is collected and recorded in documents 
or in lists and tables.3 The features characterizing the manner in which such 
a bureaucracy functions are inseparable from the existence of a written cul-
ture, but this is something remote from the population of an agrarian state: 
‘The bureaucratic way of thinking is foreign to peasants who have grown up 
in an oral culture’ (Spittler 1981: 22). Where there is a low level of market 
integration, local and regional ‘heterogeneity in economics, society and cul-
ture’ (Spittler 1981: 22) and an underdeveloped infrastructure (e.g. inadequate 
road networks), the fundamental problems for any bureaucratic administra-
tion that stem from the incongruence of written and oral culture are intensi-
3  In the period following the royal Instruction of  19 January 1723, by which the General War 
Commissariat and the General Finance Directory were amalgamated to form a single General 
Directory, serious efforts in the direction of  rationalization and enhanced effectiveness can be 
seen to have been undertaken within the central administration (Kohnke 1996; Mainka 1998; 
Schellakowsky 1998). It is therefore not surprising that the administrative reform of  1723 also 
involved the creation of  a special statistical office within the General Directory. The Commis-
sariat had played a decisive role in the process of  building up a modern administration and 
smashing the old Estate-based system in the course of  the previous two centuries (Hintze 1981). 
But despite this, in regard to the peasants, the lowest hierarchical level at which the state made 
demands upon its subjects, the central bureaucracy was long dependent upon intermediary 
administration. 
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fied. These are on the one hand the problem of collecting and processing 
information, and on the other hand that of being able to exercise domination 
(i.e. to enforce compliance with laws and regulations). The peasants to whom 
such (abstract) regulations are addressed very rarely display open resistance 
to compliance, however; rather, they generally react to the demands of the 
administration with ‘defensive strategies’ (Spittler) such as avoidance (by hid-
ing), ignoring them, bending them through wayward interpretation or con-
cealed non-compliance (Treiber 1995: 71ff.; Garve 1796). All these ‘defensive 
reactions’ and the associated communicative behaviour are characterized by 
the fact that they are not ‘sophisticated strategies for exercising influence’, 
but are rather quite simply intended to withhold important information from 
the administration, especially since this is the most important resource for 
bureaucratic administration.
These two fundamental problems of bureaucratic domination do not apply 
if arbitrary rule is exercised by government and administration: the type of 
arbitrary administration. This form of administration may appear advantageous 
because it does not ‘require any written documentation or (…) storage of in-
formation’ (Spittler 1981: 23). It is precisely in situations in which obtaining 
and storing information proves to be extremely difficult, that an arbitrary 
style of administration may come to prevail. Arbitrary rule can however only 
be used selectively and in particular places; it therefore has a very limited 
reach, in both time and space. So it is no surprise that arbitrary domination 
is always accompanied by a ‘laissez faire’ attitude, i.e. by largely abandoning 
the attempt to enforce compliance with the regulations.4 This paradoxical 
coexistence of the use of force at one point and laissez faire at another is by the 
way thoroughly characteristic of the early modern state in the Occident (Tilly 
1989). The transition to despotic rule, in which arbitrariness is accompanied 
by the threat or use of force, something to which even the lowest adminis-
trative level commonly resorts (v. Trotha 1995: 136ff.), is fluid: ‘Bureaucratic 
taxation turns into something close to looting, and organized conscription 
for military service becomes more like a hunt after people’ (Spittler 1981: 23). 
One rational solution to these two fundamental problems of bureaucratic 
administration is to be found in Spittler’s third type, intermediary administration, 
or more precisely the combination of bureaucratic and intermediary admin-
istration. The function of such ‘intermediary systems’ is to enforce compli-
4 „The economy of  the use of  violence explains the apparent paradox in the co-existence of  
violence and toleration that so astonished a European observer.  He experienced on the one 
hand a high level of  violence focussed on the imposition of  a few demands, and on the other 
an equally unfamiliar level of  disobedience to many demands made by the state.“ (Spittler 
1978: 69).
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ance with the universal requirements of the central administration and to 
collect basic information on the country and its population. Intermediary 
administration relies on middlemen who are recruited locally and are well 
rooted in the community. These people are no strangers to the written culture 
of the administrative bureaucracy, but nor are they excluded from access to 
the (semi-)oral culture of the peasants. Thanks to the way these middlemen 
are anchored in local or regional society, intermediary administration is also 
more readily able to deal with the heterogeneity described above. The mid-
dlemen fulfil both the expectations of the bureaucratic system and those of 
the (semi-)oral culture, even though, depending on their social origin and the 
prevailing constellation of power factors, they may see themselves as owing 
loyalty more to the one side or to the other. The combination described offers 
substantial advantages both in obtaining information and in collecting taxes. 
To obtain information, the middlemen predominantly communicate with the 
peasants orally, whereas for tax collection the invention of the ‘repartition’ or 
tax-farming system shows itself to be advantageous. In this system (here in 
relation to the tax known as the ‘Kontribution’) a quota is laid down in advance 
for a group of the population, which the middleman is then responsible for 
collecting and handing over to the authorities; but it is left to him to determine 
how the quota is allocated within the group concerned (Spittler 1981: 24).
Spittler’s brief  history of  tax collection, taking the Kontribution as its example, 
tells of  comparable technical difficulties, but also of  the extent to which the 
data collected was dependent on those who furnished it (which also included 
the gentry-dominated district assemblies).  This is not least because the Kontri-
bution, a land tax, was calculated on the basis of  a fictitious or virtual unit of  
measurement. This unit was the hide (Hufe) (HRG, vol. 2: col. 248ff.; Ersch/
Gruber 1980: 369), which was actually a measurement of  area, although the 
areas under agricultural use had not yet been comprehensively surveyed and 
recorded. According to Meitzen (2007: 13), triangulation did not begin in Prus-
sia until 1750. For example, when the “Generalhufenschoss’ (a levy on real 
estate) was introduced in East Prussia (1715-1719), the necessary survey of  ara-
ble land was prevented by the resistance of  the aristocracy (Spittler 1980: 591). 
In Prussia, cadastres or land registries as a basis for land tax assessment were 
first introduced in 1822, initially in the Rhineland and Westphalia, ‘and by the 
the Act of  21.5.1861 for the entire state’ (HRG, vol. 2: col. 661f.). According to 
Wagner (2005: 58), it was ‘ultimately (…) not until the land tax reform [of  21 
May 1861] and the associated creation of  new land registries in the course of  
the 1860s that the foundations were laid for the collection of  more and more 
accurate data on the situation in the countryside. It was the Land Register 
Ordinance of  5 May 1872 that finally created an information system relating 
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to parcels of  real estate, their ownership and the obligations attached to them 
that was both geographically comprehensive and also constantly kept up to 
date.’  In view of  the situation described, the yield of  arable land in Prussia 
was calculated in accordance with the ‘beschworene Aussaat’ or ‘sworn seedcast’, 
a form of  affidavit in which the peasants were required to declare how much 
seed they had sown. This ‘was assessed in bushels for every place in the mon-
archy, and the Kontribution levied in accordance with the number of  bushels 
sown.’  The Kontribution was used to finance the army. As it was levied regularly 
and represented a more or less constant amount (Büsch 1962: 22), it enabled 
the King to make himself  independent of  the Estates. In practical terms, the 
Kontribution was treated like a tribute, i.e. ‘each district was assigned a certain 
quota, which it had to raise.’ 
From the point of view of the central authority and its bureaucracy,   the 
obvious advantages of intermediary administration are accompanied by one con-
siderable disadvantage: these relatively autonomous middlemen not only make 
it more difficult for the central bureaucracy to exercise surveillance, but also 
tend ‘to mediatize the relationship between the subject and the state bureau-
cracy’ (Spittler 1980: 582). In respect of the two principal features that char-
acterize agrarian states – that it is peasants who bear the burden of taxation, 
and also form the pool from which the (standing) army is recruited – Spittler 
describes typical distinctions between the three types of administration: ‘As 
taxation is a function of bureaucracy and tribute of intermediary domination, 
so looting is a feature of despotic rule. A similar distinction can also be made 
with regard to military recruiting: bureaucratic recruiting is based on muster 
lists, intermediary recruiting on quotas; but despotic recruiting relies on hunt-
ing for people – the press gang.’ (Spittler 1980: 580). 
3. The interaction of peasant agrarian society and bureaucratic administration in 
Prussia:  Landrat and village clergyman as typical representatives of ‘intermediary 
administration’
In the 18th century, the Landrat, the chief administrative officer at district level, 
may be regarded as a typical example of intermediary administration, as can 
be seen inter alia from the fact that he was recruited from amongst the land-
owning gentry of his district, who also had the right to propose new personnel 
in the case of vacancies (Spittler 1980: 586; Büsch 1962: 77f.; Gelpke 1902). In 
the 18th century all Landräte were drawn from the aristocracy; they were pro-
posed by the Kreisstände, the district assemblies dominated by the aristocratic 
landowners, and appointed by the Crown. In 1713 the King had restricted 
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this right of proposal, but from 1756 onwards the Kreisstände were once again 
able to exercise it without restriction in all provinces of Prussia, though unti-
tled landowners were excluded (Eifert 2003: 45).
Indeed, ‘the status of the Landräte as representatives of the landowning in-
terest was in line with the concept of their office that had prevailed since the 
18th century’ (Wagner 2005: 67). The repercussions of this view that the Land-
rat represented the landed interests can still be seen as late as the end of the 
19th century in the tax evasion practiced by large landowners and the derelic-
tions of duty committed by Landräte. Both these types of offence were ‘so wide-
spread that those who committed them no longer even subjectively felt them 
to be such, but rather regarded them as representing the correct interpreta-
tion of the law’s intentions, though the application of this interpretation was 
of course to be limited to a certain social class’ (Witt 1973: 217). At the same 
time, this provides a vivid example of shortcomings in enforcement in the 
classic field of fiscal administration just at a time when the Prussian adminis-
tration appeared to be in the process of coming much closer to Weber’s ideal 
type of bureaucracy, and as late as 1911 well-regarded scholars, such as Otto 
Hintze (1981a: 27), extolled the generally admired virtues that were taken to 
characterize the Prussian civil service, namely its honesty, devotion to duty, 
professional competence, observance of the law and personal integrity.
In the 18th century the office of Landrat appeared as an ‘extended squire-
archy’ (Wagner), as can be seen, in an external view, from the fact that up 
until 1861 the Landrat’s office was located on his estate. So the paternalistic 
attitudes that were cultivated by the squire and which consequently helped to 
shape the way in which he saw himself (Wagner 2005: 158f.) were customarily 
reflected in the way he carried out his duties as Landrat, and were considered 
to be legitimate, or appropriate to his status (Wagner 2005: 159). These pa-
ternalistic attitudes are attributable amongst other things to the fact that the 
‘manorial estate (was) not only a large agricultural operation, but also had 
far-reaching rights of rule [Herrschaft] attached to it outside the economic field. 
Purely by virtue of his ownership of the estate, the great landowner exercised 
law and order functions and jurisdiction over his tenants. In 1837, around 
one-third of all Prussian subjects in the areas east of the Rhine were subject 
to this patrimonial exercise of law and order and of judicial functions’ ( Jessen 
1995: 142, referring to Koselleck 1967: 674f.; Lüdtke 1982: 196-227). Only 
after the promulgation of the Decree of 16.12.1861 was a Landrat obliged to 
reside in the town that was the administrative centre of his district and also 
to exercise his official duties from there (Wagner 2005: 74f.). The Landrat had 
to meet both the costs of keeping up his public position and also the costs of 
administration largely out of his own pocket. The latter were a major factor 
especially from the 1840s onwards, when written correspondence increased 
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in volume to such an extent that it was necessary to employ a number – vary-
ing from district to district – of clerical staff to cope with it (Wagner 2005: 76).
Even though the Landräte had officially been required to take an examina-
tion before the Higher Examinations Commission since 1770, most of them 
appear to have managed to avoid it, so that the level of (formal) qualification 
required for the office would not appear to have been particularly demanding 
at first. The same may also be deduced from the fact that the office of Landrat 
was an honorary one performed by its holder on the side (Eifert 2003: 46f.). 
It is also demonstrated by the basic level of manpower available to the Land-
rat, which up to the end of 18th century consisted of ancillary staff with low 
qualifications, a clerk and a Kreisreiter, whose job it was to tour the district and 
keep in contact with the village reeves; from 1815/16 onwards every Landrat 
then became entitled to have a district secretary to manage his office (Spittler 
1980: 586; Wagner 2005: 76; Eifert 2003: 78ff., 85). Eifert characterizes the 
tasks of a Landrat in the 18th century as being ‘an accumulation of supervisory 
duties’, and yet if the office was exercised in the manner outlined above, then 
these supervisory duties must have been undertaken for the most part through 
non-bureaucratic methods, i.e. less by the making and keeping of documents 
than by the kind of oral communication that typified the tours of inspection – 
modelled on the monarch’s ‘royal progress’ (‘koenigliche Revuereisen’) (Eifert 
2003: 78ff.) – which according to an Instruction issued in 1766 were to take 
place ‘twice a year, in the spring and in the autumn’ (Eifert 2003: 43). The 
colonial civil service was also well acquainted with this method of obtaining 
information and exercising surveillance (Spittler 1981: 105ff.) – in this case it 
was the colonial District Commissioner who was required to go ‘on tour’ or 
‘on safari’. With regard to this ‘non-bureaucratic method’ of exercising sur-
veillance, Spittler (1981: 107f.) remarks:
The type of  contact and conversation propagated in this way may allow the 
District Commissioner to penetrate the reality of  a village. But it is very dif-
ficult for him to standardize the results and manage them in a bureaucratic 
manner. The form of  communication is more appropriate to an oral culture 
than to a bureaucracy based on abstract written documentation. To this extent, 
it is no mere accident that the District Commissioner spends most of  his time 
in his office and has no time to go on tour. Producing written documents in an 
office accords with the bureaucratic way of  doing things, and creates a familiar 
reality, even if  it is a fictitious one. (…) The system of  gathering information 
called “going on tour” requires a physical presence and therefore takes up a lot 
of  time. Thus it must of  necessity be restricted to small numbers and is unable 
to cope with any mass phenomenon (large numbers of  peasants and villages) 
such as bureaucracy typically attempts to deal with.
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As late as 1816 – not long after which those areas of activity had begun to 
expand which ‘required a greater degree of written and less personal activity’ 
(Wagner 2005: 72) from the Landrat – Wagner observes that the Landrat’s task 
was ‘to govern not from his office, but from the saddle, to take decisions on 
the spot, in direct contact with those involved’ (Wagner 2005: 68), and draws 
attention to the draft of an Instruction which itself dates from the year 1816 
(!) in which it is stated that the official business of the Landrat should ‘as far as 
possible be exercised orally and should not give rise to unprofitable masses 
of paperwork’ (Wagner 2005: 68). In this Instruction it seems very clear that 
the bureaucracy was prepared to renounce a major tool which would have 
allowed it to keep the Landrat under more effective surveillance. On the other 
hand, it did appear to be interested in having such a tool available, since at the 
same time it raised demands for the Landrat to have prior qualifications and 
practical administrative experience, which would further his integration into 
the bureaucratic hierarchy (Wagner 2005: 73). This was also connected to the 
interest of the bureaucracy in detaching the Landrat from his relationship of 
loyalty to the local (landowning) elite. However, it remains, the case that with 
regard to the requirement for prior qualifications, which was understood to 
mean that the Landrat should have already taken or be in the process of tak-
ing the ‘higher administrative or legal examination’, there were substantial 
shortcomings in implementation (Eifert 2003: 120ff.). As the most important 
representative, together with the village clergyman, of ‘intermediary admin-
istration’, the Landrat was not only at the interface between the bureaucratic 
administration and its peasant subjects; he also had to act in a field of op-
posing forces, exerted mainly by the central government bureaucracy on the 
one hand and his fellow members of the local (landowning) elite on the other, 
which (furthermore) were constantly shifting through the impact of socioeco-
nomic developments (Wagner 2005: 39ff.). 
As a further representative of ‘intermediary administration’ in 18th century 
Prussia, the village clergyman must be mentioned, not least because it was he 
who supplied the data on which all important lists and tables drawn up by the 
bureaucracy were based. To Spittler he was ‘the Trojan horse which enabled 
state bureaucracy to penetrate the rural areas, bypassing the mediatizing ar-
istocracy’ (Spittler 1980: 597). Even though he was subject to the patronage of 
the squire and to this extent was in a relationship of dependency, he neverthe-
less formed an integral part of the bureaucracy: ‘The clergy were more and 
more regarded and treated as state officials. They were required to keep lists 
of the population, plant mulberry trees and proclaim new government regu-
lations from the pulpit’ (Hintze 1967: 81f., after Spittler 1980: 597).  As local 
representatives of the state church they were subject to regular visitations, i.e. 
a type of bureaucratic surveillance. Since the village clergy were on the one 
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hand able to read and write, but on the other hand also thoroughly well ac-
quainted with the ‘semi-oral culture’ of the peasants, they were highly suitable 
to fulfil the role assigned to them by the bureaucracy. The bureaucracy real-
ized that the church registers kept by the clergy, in which all important basic 
demographic data was recorded with the names of the persons concerned, 
constituted a most important and reliable source of information, so that both 
the population lists and the lists of those liable to military service were based 
on them (Spittler 1980: 597).5 There may have been some deficits in its imple-
mentation – as a result, for example, of there being an insufficient number of 
clergymen in relation to the population, or of their being unsuitable or lacking 
in commitment (Spittler 1980: 597f.) – but the fact that the data contained in 
the church registers was collected ‘for religious reasons, and not (primarily) in 
the interests of the state’ (Spittler 1980: 597) vouches for their reliability. 
It has however become customary to query the extent to which the church 
registers are reliable sources of valid information. In this regard it may suf-
fice to recall the suggestion made by the Strasbourg City Councillor Georg 
Obrecht. In his treatises on public order, published posthumously in 1644 
under the title ‘Fünff Unterschiedlichen Secreta Politica’, he presented ‘the 
first comprehensive concept of a modern administrative organization in Ger-
man political literature’. On the basis of comprehensive registers that were 
to be kept by persons designated as ‘Deputaten’ (‘commissioners’), general 
population statistics were to be compiled, while on the other hand ‘effective 
surveillance of moral behaviour’ was also to be facilitated (Maier 1980: 122-
131; Meitzen 2007: 11).  At the same time, Obrecht goes into the question as 
to ‘whether the church registers might not also be able to fulfil the purpose 
of the registers to be kept by the commissioners’ (Maier 1980: 129). It is true 
that he declared in favour of his ‘Institute of Commissioners’, mainly because 
of the objection that the church registers would not afford ‘any overview of 
the total state of the community’, since they would remain in the individual 
5 From 1719 onwards there were ‘population lists’ in Prussia, in which the turnover of  the 
population (baptisms, marriages, deaths) was recorded and these were gradually extended by 
the addition of  further headings and categories and increasingly kept in tabular form (Meitzen 
2007: 12ff.; Schaab 1967: 1). It was also on the basis of  the data obtainable from the church 
registers that the Kantonslisten were drawn up, the lists of  young men subject to military service 
kept by the Landräte (Behre 1905: 145). The population lists and historical tables were also the 
basis for the ‘population policy’, which was a classic instrument of  mercantilist economic policy 
in the 17th and 18th centuries (Blaich 1973: 1-31; 170-178), a type of  economic policy that in 
its turn demanded more comprehensive and more precise information; so that in the end the 
central administration, which initially had done no more than collect the numerical material 
and publish it (Behre 1905: 136), began to present it in tabular form in order to analyse it and 
draw conclusions.
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parishes and would thus not be known in their entirety to the authorities. All 
the same, it remains the case that through this administrative concept ‘the 
individual, detached from his or her position within a social class, the abstract 
“population”, was for the first time discovered as the object of administration’ 
(Maier 1980: 130).
4. How does Spittler avoid the trap of nostrification?
Spittler avoids the trap of nostrification in a remarkably simple way.  By 
asking the question “how does state administration work in agrarian socie-
ties?” he systematically links the structure of (bureaucratic, document-based) 
administration with the structure of an agrarian society (Spittler 1981: 9).  A 
rural peasant economy moulded by market integration not only determines 
the strategies of bureaucratic, document-based administration and the char-
acter of the peasants inhabiting a semi-oral culture; it also presents adminis-
tration with a number of problems that it must solve, and to which it responds 
with quite specific actions. These problems primarily arise from the fact that 
(on the one hand) dues and taxes have to be collected from peasants, who (on 
the other hand) represent the pool for military levies, for which every time 
serious informational problems emerge.  The various approaches selected by 
the administration can be reduced to ideal-typical structural types: to bu-
reaucratic, document-based administration; to arbitrary and despotic rule; 
and intermedial administration,6 which in practice can be observed operating 
in typical combinations, in particular that between bureaucratic, document-
based and intermedial administration.
The comparison between West African colonial administration in the pe-
riod 1919-1939 and eighteenth century Prussian administration is made by 
first considering the structure of West African agrarian society (or societies). 
These typically have “imposts” (tax payments and military service, together 
with their associated informational problems) which for their realisation have 
to be related to a suitable administrative structure, characterised in particu-
lar by a combination of bureaucratic, document-based administration with 
that of intermediaries (canton chiefs).  Separately from this eighteenth century 
Prussian agrarian society is approached in a similar manner, linking imposts 
with an administrative structure appropriate for their realisation. Here again, 
6 The relationship between bureaucratic, document-based administration and its various in-
termediaries is as a rule based upon personal rule of  a clientilist nature – the village priest is 
an exception.
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the combination between bureaucratic, document-based administration, and 
that based upon intermediaries (village priest, councillor) proves especially 
robust.  Even if the analysis in this contribution is concentrated upon the 
Prussian case, it could benefit from the analysis conducted for the West Afri-
can case, together with the insights  gained thereby; and it does not presume 
the “projection of one comparative measure derived from one’s own society.” 
(Matthes 1992: 81).  Instead, this approach opens up the space for reflection 
that Matthes demands (1992: 96), and which in the reciprocity of the analyses 
made reveals a remarkably high level of common features, as well as charac-
teristic (often culturally determined) differences, as happens for example in 
the involvement of suitable intermediaries.
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